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UAS in the NAS 
 UAS are authorized to operate commercially in the 
US National Airspace System (NAS) on a case-by-
case basis
– Part 21.25, Part 21.17(b), Section 333 Exemption, COAs, proposed sUAS 
rule etc.
 FAA Pathfinder Program
– News Gathering (CNN): Urban Area, Visual Line of Sight (VLOS)
– Agricultural Survey (PrecisionHawk): Rural Area, Extended VLOS (EVLOS)
– Railway Line Inspection (BNSF): Isolated Area, Beyond VLOS (BVLOS)
– FAA suggests “developing design standards tailored to a specific UAS 
application and proposed operating environment” [11]
 Incremental approach to gaining type-design and 
airworthiness approval 
Motivation for Approach
 Wish to enable airspace access for commercial 
applications whose vehicle platform is not ‘small’, and/or 
who may wish to operate BVLOS
 Several commercial application domains have been 
identified:
– Precision Agriculture, Inspection/Surveillance, Mapping/Surveying
 Applications may present limited set of hazards compared 
to Conventionally Piloted Aircraft (CPA), enabling 
development of a streamlined set of requirements for their 
type certification basis
 This will enable a ‘starting’ certification basis for 
(Operational Concept, Platform) pair.
Our Approach
 Provide provisional means for confined commercial 
operations that are not single –vehicle or -case limited
– Operations fall outside small UAS (sUAS) parameters
– Vehicle being used does not meet CPA airworthiness standards
– Large scale substitution of operational limits for airworthiness requirements
 Assured Containment System
– Includes localization system independent of the autopilot system 
– acts to keep Unmanned Aircraft (UA) within given bounds 
– realized by smaller set of functions than in a typical autopilot facilitates 
certification quality safety arguments 
 May ease overall effort required to regulate some special 
purpose UAS, expediting market entry
Barriers to Assurance Arguments for 
Containment
 Inadequate understanding of effect of conventional 
Hazards on Airworthiness Standards for UAS
 Lack of Assurance Arguments for Commercial Off The 
Shelf Components (COTS) in safety critical roles
 Lack of Component (e.g., sensors, actuators) Quality 
Assurance Data
 Lack of relevant C2 Datalink Standards
– Mission differences between Global Hawk and Ag operations
 Lack of Ground Based Equipment Standards
– Ground Station, Ground Based Detect and Avoid, etc.
 Lack of Ground Crew/Operator procedures
 Lack of guidance for certifying infrastructure systems
HAZARD PARTITIONING AND 
CONFINED OPERATIONS
Hazards for UAS Under Confined 
Operations
 Hazard space for CPA (on which current 
regulation is based):
– Hazards to people onboard aircraft
– Hazards to people on other aircraft
– Hazards to people and property on ground
 Lack of people onboard removes significant 
portion of CPA hazard space
 Rote removal of corresponding regulation may act 
to expose secondary hazards
 Must account for coupling between hazards
Hazard Partitioning
 CPA has inherent coupling of mitigations for 
onboard and ground hazards
– Mitigations for people on board also act to protect 
people on ground (e.g., hull integrity) 
 Hazard partitioning provides potential means to 
analyze and mitigate groupings of hazards 
independently of one another
 Mitigating common hazards over entire partitions 
requires less effort than individually mitigating 
each hazard
– e.g.,  operational restrictions for crop dusting
Confined Operations
 Further partition ground hazards with respect to 
operational area
– Hazards to people on the ground within operational area
– Hazards to people on ground outside operational area
 Can use different strategies to mitigate these 
partitions if:
– Partition is maintained (no explicit coupling across these hazard partitions)
– Any implicit coupling across partitions is managed by mitigation technique
 If partition scheme decouples hazards  Enable 
development of mitigations whose impact can be 
mapped onto relevant hazards
 Eases complexity of assurance argument
CONTAINMENT AND 
ASSURANCE ISSUES
Containment Schemes:  Class U 
Airspace [1]
 Confined operations in well-defined airspace 
volumes designated for particular tasks
 Class U: Surface to 500 feet above ground level 
below existing Class G airspace
– mechanisms to enforce this partition are airspace rules and/or 
operational procedures
 Sub-classifications 
– property ownership (private or public)
– type (rural, suburban, and urban)
 Certified geofence required to keep UA in 
designated operating area
Containment Schemes:  Geofencing
 Geofence algorithm detects when UA has 
transgressed preset boundary (or if transgression 
is imminent) 
– alert pilot or issue control command
 This requires a reliable and fault tolerant algorithm 
[2-4]
 Implementation must consider:
– computational platform upon which algorithm is implemented 
– underlying operating system [5] 
– communications architecture [6-7]
 Often implemented through autopilot
Geofences and Assurance Arguments
 For assurance purposes, no single point of 
failure between autopilot and geofence
 Assurance argument requires independence
– Cannot have common dependence on the global 
positioning system (GPS) and inertial measurement unit 
(IMU) for navigation 
– Cannot use same processor as for autopilot
– Cannot use same actuators to implement resolution 
strategy
– Must consider switching logic and timing (common 
clocks)
Assured Containment System
 Assured containment system acts to keep the UA 
within given bounds with a certification quality 
safety argument
 Safety argument must demonstrate that the UA 
will remain in a specified area in the presence of 
common vehicle, position sensing, autopilot, 
sensor and actuator failures
 Independence of assured containment system 
from UA primary avionics enables certification 
ease
Assured Containment: Components
Containment system consists of: 
– sensors that determine the vehicle state information, 
– decision logic to detect an anticipated breach of containment, 
– means to control the breach of containment (e.g., actuators for flight termination)
– Also includes: operational procedures, human-machine interfaces, and software 
required to set and validate the containment area
Assurance Argument consists of the following premises:
– containment system will be independent of the UA autopilot system as well as other 
avionics, 
– containment system will have an independent means by which to ensure the 
geospatial containment of the UA in the event of onboard autopilot, sensor and 
servomotor connection failures.  
 e.g., independent servos for flight termination, independent processor for decision logic, GPS-independent 
means of determining position etc.
– no single failure in the UA’s autopilot systems results in an automatic failure of the 
containment system 
Limited functionality may aid in certification
AGRICULTURAL CASE STUDY 
FOR ASSURED CONTAINMENT
Define Concept of Operations [8]
 Clearly define:
– Operational Scenarios
– Operational Environment
– Assumptions
– Functional Performance
– Anticipated Safety 
Considerations
 Also Relevant: economic 
considerations
Vehicle Selection [9]
 Relevant Vehicle 
characteristics
– e.g., range, 
endurance, speed
 Relevant Safety 
Concerns
– Autorotative 
capability, etc.
 Economic 
Considerations
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 Assured Containment uses multi-
lateration techniques [10]
– GPS-degraded environments
 Position determined by separate 
onboard computer that operates 
independently of the primary 
navigation system 
 Computer determines distance 
using ground-based sensors, 
compares to pre-loaded boundary
 Position and speed indicate 
boundary will be exceeded
Signal generated to close 
emergency fuel control valve, 
forcing the UA to the ground
Independent 
Power Source
Hazard Analysis
 For the clearly defined Conops, an Operational 
Hazard Assessment (in conjunction with the 
selected vehicle) will yield relevant hazards
– Evaluate with respect to severity
 Vehicle specific hazards (that are evinced in 
operational context) are then aggregated
– Controllability, maneuverability, etc.
 In the context of operational and environmental 
assumptions, this forms the set of hazards to be 
mitigated (airworthiness, operational, training…)
– Ground Station, Operator, Communication Links, etc.
Develop Type Certification Basis
 Can develop regulation for each hazard that 
will result in desired level of mitigation
– Can use available regulation for conventional hazards
– Can modify available regulation to fit similar hazards in 
new context
– Can abstract  groups of requirements
– Can simplify many requirements 
– Develop regulation for aspects of vehicle/operation that 
are novel
 e.g., Communications Link , Containment Area
Proposed Containment System 
Requirements
 Preliminary requirements for a containment system must 
mitigate the hazards associated with escape from the 
containment volume.  
 Additional requirements address: 
– The accuracy of the aircraft’s location relative to the containment boundaries, 
– Situational awareness of the UA’s location relative to the containment boundaries, 
– Failure of infrastructure related to position information (e.g., GPS, cell phone 
network), 
– Means of detecting impending boundary violations,
– Means of alerting the pilot in command,
– Means of ensuring the UA remains within the established containment boundaries at 
all times; and,
– Release of high energy parts that may constitute a hazard to crewmembers 
bystanders outside the containment area.
SUMMARY
Assured Containment Concept Summary
 Assured containment system consists of:
– hardware, software and operational procedures 
– evidentiary material (e.g., safety analysis, reliability data, proofs, etc.) that 
demonstrate the system performs its intended containment function at the required 
level of assurance  
 Assured containment system must be analyzed as a whole 
(for airworthiness), including
– documented, fixed design
– failure modes that can be clearly understood, (and mitigated or controlled)  
 Due to focused functionality, effort required to develop and 
certify assured containment system may be less than the 
effort required for conventional UAS autopilot and 
supporting systems
Perspectives
 Enabling access to airspace for a wide class of 
vehicles and applications will require either:
– Case by case evaluation or
– Reuse of assurance concepts and arguements to form a 
common certification basis across vehicles and 
operational concepts
 Concept of assured containment offers one 
possible approach to streamlined development of 
design standards tailored to UAS applications 
suitable for confined, rural operational 
environments
Implications
 Yields streamlined approach to airworthiness certification
– Allows midsize UAS to operate near populated areas
 Could enable further commercial uses: 
– herd management, natural resource exploration, wind 
turbine, pipeline, and power line inspections etc.,  
 Industry and regulators gain valuable experience with UAS 
while carefully controlling access and potential harm to the 
aviation system as a whole 
 Use of operationally driven type certification bases may 
provide relief while maintaining safety, and begin to build a 
foundation for certification over other classes of operations 
and vehicles
Questions?
Your text hereNatasha.A.Neogi@nasa.gov
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